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Articles – Theoretical Debate: 
An Existential   State   of ‘Being’:   Gender 
Crisis, Conflict, and Struggles. 
Shereen H. Shaw  
Much of the debate within the philosophy of gender puts forward the 
premise that the biological differences between males and females are 
straightforward, whereas the social and cultural aspects of being a man 
or woman are much more complicated. (see Butler, 1990; El Saadawi in 
Shaw, 2017; Greer, 1971; Irigaray, 1987/1993) Through a Sartrean 
philosophical lens, I will highlight questions into the nature of our being, 
regardless of sex, gender, race, religion and culture, which are at the very 
heart of every philosophy of gender debate. The article presents an 
existential theoretical perspective on the notion of conflict and struggle. 
It aims to show how existentialism, as a twenty-first century philosophy, 
and perhaps as a view of life, transcends our contemporary understanding 
of gender and identity. The article posits that at the very heart of every 
investigation into the ontology of our being is the question of the nature of 
our struggles, first and foremost, with our being, and secondly, with our 
surroundings. To present some of the key principles, I will use narrative 
to bring to life Jean Paul Sartre’s theoretical explorations underpinning 
his existential philosophy. In doing so, I will also highlight its relevance for 
exploring gender in embodied examples through one’s life cycle. 
 
 
The humble beginning:  In Being and 
Nothingness, (1943/2006) one of the 
best-known existential texts, we 
encounter Sartre’s first investigation 
of  the  consciousness of being; or, in 
other words, the phenomenological 
ontology of our existence. Our 
world, Sartre contends, is a series of 
finite appearances that surround us, 
and we, from humble beginnings, 
start to learn about them as part of 
our existence. To highlight the 
dynamic nature of our existence in 
relation to our surroundings, one 
could say that from the  moment  of 
announcing “we are having a baby”, 
expectations begin to form, and the 
questions begin; I  wonder if it will 
be a boy or a girl. It is a thrill; the 
excitement of adding a boy to the 
family brings to the parents an 
unspoken pride of carrying the 
family’s name as the legacy lives on 
and, if it is a girl, anticipation of the 
joys she brings into the house and 
the children she will bear. As the 
scan to determine the baby’s sex 
takes place, the parents’ 
expectations manifest in how they 
construct the early months of the 
child’s life; the chosen décor and 
colour scheme of the room, the 
clothes, the toys, the pram and, 
with this, the growing expectations 
which often extend to predicting 
what he or she will be like. Then, a 
child is born, and we hear a cry of 
joy; “it is a girl!” or “it is a boy!” It is 
announced. Suddenly, everything 
surrounding the child’s existence 
falls into place and the parents 
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begin a journey that they believe 
they have constructed well. Sartre 
saw the scenario of being brought 
into this world as an intricate 
process that triggers a series of 
unfolding conflicts and struggles. 
His description of the ontological 
modes of being in his work (p.98), 
distinguishes being -in-itself (être- 
en-soi) and being- for-itself (être- 
pour-soi). 
Being- in-itself, as a mode of 
existence, also described by Sartre 
as material entities, bodies in the 
world. (see Husserl in Gusman, 
2018) Sartre presents this as a 
mode of all non-conscious bodies 
which are concrete and lack the 
ability to change; like a tree or a 
table for example, their “being is 
what it is” (Being and Nothingness, 
p.98). On the other hand, being- 
for-itself, is consciousness and, yet 
it is lacking in a definite nature and 
lacking in self-identity. Sartre 
writes, “the law of being of the for- 
itself, as the ontological foundation 
of consciousness, is to be itself in 
the form of presence to itself.” 
(p.101) This undefined, non- 
determined nature is what makes, 
according to Sartre, understanding 
the nature of our being and 
existence in the world so complex. 
To simplify, when a human is born, 
he is a being in-itself, a human 
body, an object. This body can 
create and re-create itself in the 
world, becoming something else, 
actuating its own being as an object 
for-itself. “The self cannot be a 
property of being-in-itself…The self 
refers, but it refers precisely to the 
subject. It indicates a relation 
between the subject and himself, 
and this relation is precisely a 
duality, but a particular duality 
since it requires particular verbal 
symbols.” (p.100) The development 
of one’s being as a being for it-self 
can be best understood by how a 
child begins to grow and sees more 
of the world and expresses it’s being 
in a manner that aligns with the 
expectations, so well-constructed. 
The social expectation is often that 
the growing child gravitates 
towards their birth-assigned 
gender; either all that is feminine, 
fulfilling the construct of social 
female beauty, or all that is 
masculine. Sartre explains that 
being for-itself can adapt an 
attitude towards itself by being 
separated by a nothingness and, 
thus, never identical to itself; it can 
never encounter its own 
subjectivity. (Stevens, 2008) This- 
namely that ‘consciousness is to 
exist at a distance from itself as 
presence to itself” (Being and 
Nothingness, p.102)- is the cause 
for human anguish and despair. 
Sartre saw that the human reality 
present to being in-itself and 
engaged in the world reveal an 
empty distance where ‘being’ 
carries also nothingness. For 
example, when a child grows into a 
man or a woman, it develops and 
adapts in the process of forming an 
identity, the social and parental 
expectations which become fulfilled 
and yet, the child is never fulfilled 
themselves. 
“The separation which 
separates belief from itself 
cannot be grasped or even 
conceived in isolation. If we 
seek to reveal it, it vanishes. 
We find belief once more as 
pure immanence. But if, on the 
other hand, we wish to 
apprehend belief as such, 
then the fissure is there, 
appearing when we do not 
wish to see it, disappearing as 
soon as we seek to 
- 30 - British Mensa’s: ANDROGYNY, Spring Edition – April 2019  
contemplate it. This fissure 
then is the pure negative.” 
(Sartre, 2003, p.102) 
As Sartre eloquently reveals, 
we suffer as we strive in life to 
become a “being- in-itself-for-itself” 
(être-en-soi- pour soi); tormented by 
the longing to be both; the subject 
and object of our being. This, Sartre 
says, is the ‘existential fundamental 
project’ that he and his intellectual 
partner, Simone de Beauvoir, 
advocated. He, to clarify, writes that 
“distance, laps of time, 
psychological difference can be 
apprehended in themselves and 
include as such elements of 
positivity; they have a simple 
negative function. But the fissure 
within consciousness is a nothing 
except by what it denies, and it can 
have ‘being’ only as we do not see it. 
This negative- which is the 
nothingness of being and the 
nihilating power- both together, is 
nothingness.” (p.102) At a stage in 
life, a key turning point, a young 
woman or a young man, begin to 
express their identity in a different 
manner, one that conflicts with the 
social norms and traditions, where 
conflicts and struggles emerge. This 
new identity, for a female, for 
example, may mean pleading for 
parity with men, politically, 
economically and socially. What 
seemed like a perfectly well 
constructed upbringing suddenly 
becomes a detraction from ‘being’ 
and, perhaps also, from  being 
young. In Sartrean terms, anguish 
and despair surface when “it is the 
obligation for the for-itself never to 
exist except in the form of an 
elsewhere in relation to itself, to 
exist as a being which perpetually 
effects in itself a  weakness  of being.” 
(102) For example, every choice 
becomes calculated with the 
fear that culture, society or religion 
frowns upon it. Individual 
preferences become struggles; 
these choices are not simply liking 
dark colours, intellectual 
conversation, cigarettes or even 
replacing a wardrobe of dresses 
with suits, shoes with high-heeled 
boots or vice versa. They are 
moments of crisis, of self- 
awareness and, more importantly, 
perhaps, of self-expression. For 
Sartre, the encounter with the 
Other, and the struggles that the 
two modes of existence bring, 
creates a scope for new 
possibilities. He writes: 
“Here the appearance of the 
Other is indispensable not to 
the constitution of the world 
and of my empirical “Ego” but 
to the very existence of my 
consciousness as self- 
consciousness. In fact, as self- 
consciousness, the Self itself 
apprehends itself. The 
equation “Myself=myself” or “I 
am I” is precisely the 
expression of this fact. At first 
this self-consciousness is 
pure self-identity, pure 
existence for itself. It has 
certitude of itself, but this 
certitude still lacks truth. In 
fact, this certitude would be 
true only to the extent that its 
own existence for itself 
appeared to it as an 
independent object. Thus, 
self- consciousness is first a 
syncretic relation without 
truth between a subject and 
an object, an object, which is 
not yet objectified, and which 
is this subject himself…” 
Sartre then concludes: “the 
mediator is the Other. The Other 
appears along with myself since 
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self-consciousness is identical with 
itself by means of the exclusion of 
every Other.” (ibid, p.260) 
In one of Sartre’s most well- 
known existential narratives, 
Nausea (1938, 2000). The novel 
presents how relationships fail and 
spiral into self-defeating attitudes 
towards the Other. We see a 
character, Antoine Roquentin,  who 
is afraid of the burden of freedom, 
choices and decisions. Sartre 
presents an interplay, a trilogy, 
between our states of being-in- 
itself, being-for-itself and being-for- 
others (être-pour-autrui). The 
narrative shows the complexity of 
attempting to make sense of our 
human nature and at the same time 
to be in the world. For Sartre, we are 
all protagonists in our own 
narratives, longing for 
reassurances in life and craving for 
control over what we believe to be 
our destiny, as well as our 
conception of an absolute identity 
(which often is the source of conflict 
with Others). He writes, “I am the 
mode of not being what I am and of 
being what I am not” (Being and 
Nothingness, p.297). The crisis, he 
believes, is in realising that life has 
passed by in a flash and the 
realisation that one has made poor 
choices or never truly lived is what 
becomes difficult to comprehend or 
even accept. Furthermore, at the 
same time, we struggle to accept, or 
come to terms with, the daily 
realisation of the futility of life; 
described as “uneasiness, a lived 
wrenching away from the ekstatic 
unity of the for-itself, a limit which 
I cannot reach and which yet I am.” 
(ibid, p.299) 
In Sartre’s novel, the two 
female figures present the 
expectations put upon the 
protagonist, Roquentin. The first is 
Anny who is Roquentin’s previous 
lover; she seeks his company and 
acts as a constant reminder of the 
person who he used to be. The 
second is Francoise, who is 
Roquentin’s present lover and a 
Barmaid at a local café. The conflict 
between the past and present is 
signified by both relationships, 
which haunt and pressure 
Roquentin to react and behave in 
certain ways. The past relationship 
is often re-lived in the present when 
Anny reminds Roquentin of the 
‘perfect moments’ and yet, she 
refuses to be part of his present. 
Francoise, on the other hand, 
signified the moments he 
confronted the bare existence of 
objects in life and realised that 
‘existence precedes essence’; 
Sartre’s fundamental declaration. 
Roquentin’s horror upon realising 
that objects and people mask the 
nothingness of our existence, the 
futility of our being, caused his 
nausea. Once he accepts this 
realisation, the meaninglessness of 
his being and that of others and of 
his surroundings, he embraces his 
existence fully. For Sartre, 
Roquentin is not identical to his 
past or his future. He is no longer 
what he was, and he is not yet what 
he will: through time, he never 
coincides with himself. Sartre 
describes the past as the ‘facticity of 
human life’, we cannot choose what 
is already spent. The future, 
however, presents ample 
opportunities for freedom of the 
being- for-itself. As freedom and 
facticity form an inconsistency 
within the being- for-itself, 
generating  instability,  this 
inconsistency is the being for- 
itself’s most important task to form 
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projects to better understand the 
human being. 
Another example from 
narrative which posits that conflict 
is the original-mode of being-for- 
others, is Sartre’s play, Huis Clos 
(2000). Conflict was one of the 
themes that was presented strongly 
in the play. This is reiterated in de 
Beauvoir’s work, The Second Sex 
(1949/2011) where she questions 
the dynamics of male-female 
relationships and posits the 
premise that it is the notion of 
struggle and conflict that 
contributes to our ability to 
overcome some of our self-defeating 
anxieties towards the Other. 
Looking more closely, de Beauvoir 
and Sartre’s relationship as lovers, 
intellectual partners and life- 
companions is one where being-for- 
others is explored. Their 
relationship has been without a 
doubt the subject of controversial 
debates within philosophy and the 
philosophy of gender. Recording 
Sartre’s proposal, de Beauvoir 
wrote about the pact they forged in 
1929, “we were two of a kind, and 
our relationship would endure as 
long as we did: but it could not 
make up entirely for the fleeting 
riches to be had from encounters 
with different people.” 
(Appignanesi, 2005) They met at 
such a young age at the Sorbonne. 
Two very bright students, unaware 
of the force that brought them 
together to become one of the most 
famous literary couples. Together, 
they put forward existentialism, as 
a philosophy, and a way of life. 
Their writings on being-for-others, 
the struggles in life, the dichotomy 
of chance and choice, describing 
the joy and the pain of a state of 
being that is often in conflict with 
the very essence of its existence, led 
to the popularity of existentialism 
as a trend. It attracted an academic 
and non-academic audience as a 
philosophy (and a lense through 
which to view life) over the years. 
Sartre and de Beauvoir’s 
relationship as a model of an 
examination into our state of being 
has contributed to their resistance 
and lack of conformity to every 
traditional mode of social- 
commitment. 
“From early on, Notre-Dame- 
de-Sartre, as the wits dubbed 
her, organises the comings 
and goings of Sartre's 
"contingent" women; she 
encourages,  consoles, 
manipulates, and continues to 
do so until the very end for 
that loose grouping of friends 
and exes they called their 
"family".” (Appignanesi, 
2005) 
In All Said and Done (1977), in her 
autobiography, de Beauvoir puts 
forward, in what seems to be a 
stream of consciousness, a 
reflection on her past, present and 
future. She writes that despite our 
very humble existence that leaves 
us perplexed about the nature of 
our lives, the chances we take and 
choices that shape our experiences 
are often believed to be experiences 
well-planned; constructs of our 
desires and needs. Thus, they are 
considered ‘non-accidental’. 
“The penetration of that 
particular ovum by that 
particular spermatozoon, with 
its implications of the meeting 
of my parents and before that 
of their birth and the births of 
all their forebears, had not 
one chance in hundreds of 
millions of coming about. And 
it was chance, a chance quite 
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unpredictable in the present 
state of science, that caused 
me to be born a woman. From 
that point on, it seems to me 
that a thousand different 
futures might have stemmed 
from every single movement of 
my past: I might have fallen ill 
and broken off my studies; I 
might not have met Sartre; 
anything at all might have 
happened. Tossed into this 
world, I have been subjected 
to its laws and its 
contingencies, ruled by wills 
other than my own, by 
circumstances, by history: it is 
therefore reasonable to for me 
to suggest that I am myself 
contingent…. I have to take 
the fact that I do exist as my 
starting point.” (Plummer, xii) 
Sartre and de Beauvoir magnified in 
their existential philosophy several 
lenses of examining the ontology of 
our being. But it is the ‘what if’ 
concept that is a common thread in 
the writings of both intellectuals 
and which underlies many of 
Sartre’s literary narratives. The 
question of “what if” keeps us, 
throughout our lives, puzzled about 
incidents and choices that we 
make. What if we took a different 
path, made a different friend, took 
a risk? Will our choices make us 
who we are and lead us all the same 
to the persons we are meant to be 
regardless of the routes that we 
take? In a key section of her 
autobiography, Beauvoir magnifies 
our rise and fall as beings in-this- 
world; she uses a female figure, a 
friend of Sartre, Camille, who was 
referenced in her earlier works. 
Camille’s story is used symbolically 
to show the horrors and fragility of 
life and the expectations that we set 
ourselves and  consider  to  be  our 
destiny. From the description of 
Camille’s state, the message seems 
to be that as human beings we 
quickly realise, with time and age, 
how far our expectations of 
ourselves are from our control. The 
young Camille was someone who de 
Beauvoir looked up to and had so 
much admiration for. Described in 
de Beauvoir’s earlier writings as an 
intelligent and charismatic lady 
who aspired to be a writer, but 
whose life took a different turn with 
excessive drinking, Camille 
becomes a shadow of her previous 
self in de Beauvoir’s description. On 
human biology, de Beauvoir writes; 
“to be present in the world implies 
strictly that there exists a body 
which is at once a material thing in 
the world (être-en-soi) and a point of 
view towards this world (être-pour- 
soi); but nothing requires that this 
body have this or that particular 
structure”. (The Second Sex, 1949, 
p.38) The narrative concludes with 
Camille’s deteriorated health, her 
body frail and her spirit faded as 
she passes away. As a couple, 
Sartre and de Beauvoir cared for 
and admired Camille. There were 
many visits to Camille before and 
after she was admitted to the 
hospital by de Beauvoir. 
It is perhaps in de Beauvoir’s 
depiction of the hospital that a tone 
of disappointment in life, a sense of 
betrayal that it could declare victory 
over Camille becomes apparent; 
we see an emphasis on the ‘tragedy 
of being’. Camille was helpless, 
presented as defeated by life and in 
a demeaning state. For both Sartre 
and de Beauvoir, the dichotomy of 
life and death, the struggle of being 
and conflicts with others and, 
perhaps most of all, the submission 
to one’s destiny at the face of life’s 
futility, are key elements in all 
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intellectual endeavors within the philosophy of gender. Through 
an existentialist lense, gender struggle and conflict become a 
feature of the fundamental  project where progress of life 
through time creates an infinite past and a future that is full of 
possibilities. The pact between two intellectuals, Sartre and de 
Beauvoir, was about acknowledging the lack of grounding to our 
being; this is the reason we often feel incomplete or experience
 a  sense  of meaninglessness in our lives. 
We are in conflict, not with anyone else, but with ourselves. 
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